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ATTORNEY ADVERTISING-FIRST AMENDMENT-PENNSYLVANIA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT-A federal court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
has held that portions of the Pennsylvania Code of Professional
Responsibility relating to attorney advertising are violative of the
first amendment to the United States Constitution.
Spencer v. The Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
W. Boyd Spencer III, an attorney admitted to practice law in
Pennsylvania, initiated a § 1983 action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania1 seeking a de-
claratory judgment that several provisions of the Pennsylvania
Code of Professional Responsibility were unconstitutional. He also
sought to enjoin their future enforcement.' Spencer, a certified pi-
lot, held a master's degree in computer science along with his li-
cense to practice law.$ Spencer wished to utilize advertisements
and direct mailings to convey these credentials both to the general
public and to specific segments of the populations.4
Judge Lord, ruling upon the declaratory judgment, first acknowl-
edged Spencer's contentions that portions of the Code prohibiting
the desired advertising violated the first and fourteenth amend-
ments of the United States Constitution as unfairly limiting the
content as well as the time, place and manner of lawyer advertising
and/or solicitation. Judge Lord then briefly addressed the state's
assertion that Spencer lacked standing in that he failed to raise a
justiciable case or controversy.6 Judge Lord remarked that Spen-
1. Spencer v. The Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 579 F.
Supp. 880, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1984). § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-
ing for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
2. 579 F. Supp. at 882.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. I; XIV, § 1.
6. 579 F. Supp. at 882-83. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983). To acquire
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cer's position took on significance in light of the fact that his
claims would have been decided by the very court that maintained
the constitutionality of the rules.' He then concluded that Spencer
had the requisite personal stake in the suit, and that there was a
substantial controversy between parties who had adverse legal
interests.8
Judge Lord, resolving the constitutionality of the challenged dis-
ciplinary rules, noted that first amendment protection was earlier
extended to commercial speech in Virginia Pharmacy Board v.
Virginia Consumer Council,9 and later enveloped lawyer advertis-
ing in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.10 The consumer's right to
receive useful information, according to Judge Lord, was one value
sought to be vindicated in Bates, which also held that fraudulent,
deceptive or misleading advertising would not be protected." De-
spite the protection afforded a newspaper advertisement for lawyer
services in Bates, Judge Lord noted that such protection had been
specifically denied to in-person solicitation by lawyers in another
Supreme Court ruling, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association.
2
Judge Lord maintained that in-person solicitation, unlike newspa-
per advertising, has the potential to create situations involving co-
ercion, undue influence, intimidation or overreaching, the preven-
tion of which is within the legitimate interests of the state and
permits it to regulate a lawyer's conduct.'3 Judge Lord thus con-
cluded that although certain commercial speech is protected, some
state regulation is permitted."'
standing, one must possess a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy [which as-
sures] concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues. . ." 579 F. Supp. at
883. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). Judge Lord observed that it must be
determined whether a plaintiff has suffered an "actual or threatened injury." 579 F. Supp.
at 883. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979). Judge Lord
also noted that the threatened prosecution must be more than "imaginary or speculative."
579 F. Supp. at 883. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974).
7. 579 F. Supp. at 884. See Adler v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175 (1978), ap-
peal dismissed, 442 U.S. 907 (1979).
8. 579 F. Supp. 884.
9. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Virginia Pharmacy held unconstitutional a Virginia statute
declaring that it was prohibited unprofessional conduct for licensed pharmacists to advertise
the price of prescription drugs. Id. at 771-73.
10. 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977)(prohibition of newspaper advertisment of lawyer's fees
and services which were neither fraudulent nor misleading held unconstitutional). See also
infra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
11. 579 F. Supp. at 885.
12. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). See also infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
13. 579 F. Supp. at 885. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462.
14. 579 F. Supp. at 886-87.
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Judge Lord allotted special attention to Central Hudson Gas
and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 5 which clarified
the scope of first amendment protection afforded commercial
speech and emphasized the importance of an informed public.16
The Central Hudson court determined that since the function of
commercial speech is to inform, the government can prohibit false
and misleading advertising.1 7 Any regulation of commercial speech
which is not misleading, according to the Central Hudson court,
must advance a substantial state interest and must be narrowly
drawn."
Judge Lord noted that the first case challenging regulation of
attorney advertising and solicitation that applied the Central Hud-
son test was In Re R.M.J.'9 In that case the Missouri disciplinary
rules were held unconstitutional, as the advertisement in question
was found not to be misleading and no substantial state interest
was advanced that would justify the regulation.20 Judge Lord ob-
served that although the Court found that the direct mailings un-
dertaken by the petitioner constituted a "troubling issue," the
state failed to show that it was unable to supervise the mailings,
thereby making a complete ban on the activity constitutionally
prohibited.2'
Judge Lord addressed Spencer's first contention that Discipli-
nary Rule (DR) 2-101(A)22 unfairly prevented him from using the
word "experienced" in his advertising as related to his position as
15. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
16. Id. at 562.
17. Id. at 563.
18. Id. at 564. To determine whether a regulation violated first amendment rights, the
Central Hudson Court proposed submitting the regulation to a four part test. The test con-
sists of determining: (1) whether the commercial speech concerns lawful activity and is not
misleading; (2) whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial; (3) whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interests asserted; and (4) whether the regu-
lation is more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Id. at 566.
19. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). In In re R.M.J., a lawyer had mailed announcement cards to a
selected group of people and had advertised in the newspaper and the yellow pages, stating
the jurisdictions in which he was admitted and the areas of his practice. Id. at 196-97. See
also infra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
20. 579 F. Supp. at 886.
21. Id. The court in In re R.M.J. indicated that submission of a copy of the proposed
advertisement to an advisory committee would be one method of supervision less restrictive
than a complete ban. Id. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206.
22. 579 F. Supp. at 857. Section (A) provides: "No lawyer shall engage in, utilize, or
allow any form of advertising that is knowingly false, fraudulent or misleading." CODE OF
PROFESSxONAL RESPONSEBILiTY DR 2-101(a), 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1984).
The provisions of the disciplinary code found unconstitutional by the court were sus-
pended shortly thereafter by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See infra note 106.
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a pilot and computer programmer.2" Judge Lord agreed with the
state, however, that words such as "experienced" were subjective
and misleading by nature.2 4 Citing Bates25 and Bishop v. Commit-
tee on Professional Ethics,2 6 Judge Lord reaffirmed the position
that the state possesses a substantial interest in the professional
standards of lawyers. He then emphasized that consumers had to
be protected by the state against misstatements caused by subjec-
tive descriptions of the quality of a lawyer's services. Judge Lord
went on to note that subjective claims, such as "experienced" or
"competent" were difficult to measure or verify and could easily be
applicable either to a lawyer who handled a small number of a par-
ticular type of case, or a lawyer who handled substantially more of
the same type of case. Judge Lord concluded that Spencer could
convey his particular skills both as a pilot and a lawyer in a more
objective manner.2 7 Judge Lord thus determined that prohibition
of a subjective term, such as "experience," worked to advance a
substantial state interest and was not more extensive than
necessary.2 e
Judge Lord next addressed Spencer's challenge of the constitu-
tional validity of DR 2-103(A) 29 and DR 2-104(A) ° which provided
for a blanket ban on lawyer solicitation. 1 The intended solicitation
by Spencer was direct mailing to those whom he learned were pos-
23. 579 F. Supp. at 887. DR 2-102(D) and 2-102(E), concerning the advertising by an
attorney that he practices another profession in addition to practicing law, were considered
nonjusticiable, since the state agreed that these rules did not prohibit such advertising so
long as it was not false, fraudulent or misleading. 579 F. Supp. at 887 n.7.
24. 579 F. Supp. at 887.
25. Id. See also supra note 10.
26. 521 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D. Iowa 1981), vacated as moot, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir.
1982).
27. 579 F. Supp. at 887-88. According to Judge Lord, Spencer could objectively convey
his experience as a pilot by indicating the hours flown and his certification by the Federal
Aviation Administration. He could also objectively convey his experience as a lawyer by
indicating his years in practice or the number of cases handled. Id.
28. Id. at 888. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
29. 579 F. Supp. at 888. Section (A) provides: "A lawyer shall not recommend employ-
ment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has
not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer." CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY DR 2-103(A), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1984).
30. 579 F. Supp. at 888. Section (A) provides, in pertinent part: "A lawyer who has
given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall
not accept employment resulting from that advice .... " CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BiLITY DR 2-104(A), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1984).
31. 579 F. Supp. at 888. Spencer's challenge to DR 2-103(C) was held non-justiciable
since the state maintained that this rule did not prevent uncompensated third parties, with
whom Spencer had contact, from recommending his services. Id. at n.8.
Vol. 23:305
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sibly in need of legal assistance and were at the same time partici-
pants in his areas of interest.3 2 Judge Lord acknowledged the
state's explanation that direct mailing was allowed as long as it did
not constitute solicitation, but nevertheless maintained that the
state had failed to demonstrate how and when direct mailing
crosses from advertising to solicitation." This failure, Judge Lord
asserted, did not give Spencer the requisite notice as to what con-
duct was prohibited.84 Therefore, in light of DR 2-101(A), which
permitted all but fraudulent and misleading advertising, Judge
Lord found the challenged disciplinary rules involving solicitation
to be unconstitutionaly vague.35
Judge Lord also maintained that, in addition to being prohibi-
tively vague, the challenged disciplinary rules concerning direct
mail solicitation did not pass the four part test of Central Hud-
son." Judge Lord first pointed out that the blanket ban on all di-
rect mail solicitation necessarily encompassed both, protected and
unprotected speech and was thus violative of the first amendment,
but continued on to apply the remaining portions of the Central
Hudson test, which he stated were applicable to advertising which
was neither false nor misleading. 7 The state had advanced three
interests in order to legitimize the regulation of mail solicitation:
(1) protecting the public from invasion of privacy; (2) protecting
the public from undue influence and overreaching; and (3) protect-
ing the public from conflicts of interest.8 Judge Lord maintained
that protection from invasion of privacy was not a substantial state
interest.89 He further concluded that protecting the public from
undue influence and overreaching was a substantial interest, but
nevertheless held that a total ban on direct mailing could not be
justified.4 0 Finally, although Judge Lord found protection from
32. 579 F. Supp. at 888.
33. Id.
34. Id. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
35. 579 F. Supp. at 888. For the text of DR 2-101(A), see supra note 22.
36. 579 F. Supp. at 889.
37. Id. Judge Lord conceded that some direct mail solicitation may be misleading and
that the state possessed a substantial interest in protecting the public from such deception,
but still held that the state cannot prohibit both protected and unprotected speech. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 890. Judge Lord recognized that while in-person solicitation necessarily in-
volves a captive audience, those who receive direct mail solicitations are by contrast free to
discard them. He therefore concluded that protection of the public from invasion of privacy
was not a substantial state interest. Id. at 890 n.13.
40. Id. at 890. Additionally, Judge Lord determined that the forces of in-person solici-
tation-pressure, intimidation, lack of time for response, reflection or education-were not
1984 309
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conflicts of interest to be as a substantial interest, he also found
that the state had failed to show how such a conflict could occur.
Still, Judge Lord held that the state could regulate direct mail so-
licitation when an actual conflict could be identified.41
Judge Lord next addressed Spencer's challenge of the disclaimer
requirement of DR 2-105(B). Judge Lord discerned as the state
interest in the disclaimer requirement the importance of prevent-
ing the general public from construing the advertisement as an im-
plied assertion of expertise or specialization, this conclusion being
reached in light of Pennsylvania's refusal to recognize specialists.43
Judge Lord noted that Spencer had contended that a strong dis-
claimer of certification or recognition of the lawyer as a specialist
may itself be misleading.4 ' Judge Lord acknowledged that a dis-
claimer requirement concerning lawyer advertising can prevent
misleading advertising,4 5 but nonetheless found the Pennsylvania
requirement to be more extensive than necessary since compliance
with such a requirement could conceivably give rise to the negative
inference that those advertising and using a disclaimer were not
certified or recognized specialists, while others not advertising
were.46 Judge Lord then ruled that the challenged disciplinary rule
present in direct mail solicitation, since the recipient was not under pressure or intimidation
and had time for reflection and education. Further, the state failed to persuasively enumer-
ate situations involving susceptible recipients and, even if such recipients were identifiable,
any absolute prohibition would be too broad. Id.
41. Id. See Greene v. Grievance Comm., 54 N.Y.2d 118, 429 N.E.2d 390, 444 N.Y.S.2d
883 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982). Judge Lord indicated that the regulation
must only extend to action necessary to prevent the conflict of interest. Reasoning that
direct mail solicitation provided the public with valuable information, and recognizing the
constitutional protection of this public interest, the potential problem of an increase in liti-
gation caused by direct mailing was held not to be of sufficient weight to ban the action. 579
F. Supp. at 890-91. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 376; In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 436-37 (1978).
42. 579 F. Supp. at 891. Section (B) provides:
A statement, announcement, or holding out as limiting practice to one or more par-
ticular fields of law or as concentrating practice in one or more particular fields of law
does not constitute a violation of DR 2-105(A) if the statement, announcement or
holding out is factually correct and clearly states that the lawyer or law firm is not
recognized or certified as a specialist in the field or fields of law in which the lawyer
or law firm limits or concentrates its practice; provided, however, no such disclaimer
of recognition or certification shall be required of the lawyer or law firm if the publi-
cation in which the statement, announcement or holding out appears contains general
information to the same effect.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL Ra.SPONsmn.rrY DR 2-105(B), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon
1984).
43. 579 F. Supp. at 891 n.18.
44. 579 F. Supp. at 891.
45. Id. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 384.
46. 579 F. Supp. at 891-92. Judge Lord also believed that fear of such an inference
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was not the least restrictive means for the state to protect the pub-
lic interest and thus held that it was violative of the first
amendment.47
In conclusion, Judge Lord addressed Spencer's challenge of the
constitutionality of DR 2-105(A)(3). 45 Spencer's objections, Judge
Lord noted, were that under this rule he was unfairly limited to
merely informing other lawyers of his availability to be a consult-
ant in particular areas, and that the requirement that the adver-
tisement be "dignified" was unconstitutionally vague.49 In re-
sponse, Judge Lord first maintained that the asserted state interest
in protecting the reader of the advertisement was not tenable,
since the targets of the advertisement were other lawyers. 50 Al-
though agreeing with Spencer's first argument, Judge Lord took a
different view concerning the alleged vagueness of the "dignified"
requirement, maintaining that such a requirement indicated that
the lawyer was to use caution in his advertisements, further ad-
vancing the state's legitimate interest in maintaining a positive im-
age of the legal profession. 51 Judge Lord thus found that the sec-
tion did not violate the constitution.
Judge Lord then directed that relief be given to Spencer, grant-
ing his motion for summary judgment to the extent of those provi-
sions of the code found to be unconstitutional. 52 Injunctive relief,
however, was denied.53 Spencer thus worked to invalidate some,
but not all, of the challenged Pennsylvania disciplinary provisions.
One of the earliest cases with significant impact on the issue of
lawyer advertising was Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,5 in which
could cause the advertising lawyer to forego advertising otherwise useful information con-
cerning his practice. Id. at 892.
47. Id. at n.19.
48. 579 F. Supp. at 892. Section (A)(3) provides, in pertinent part:
A lawyer shall not hold himself out publicly as, or imply that he is a recognized or
certified specialist, except as follows: [a] lawyer available to act as a consultant to or
as an associate of other lawyers in a particular branch of law or legal service may
distribute to other lawyers and publish in legal journals a dignified announcement of
such availability, but the announcement shall not contain a representation of special
competence or experience.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmILrTY DR 2-105(A)(3), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon
1984).
49. 579 F. Supp. at 892.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 893.
53. Id.
54. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). See supra note 10. For analysis and discussion of Bates, see
Boden, Five Years After Bates: Lawyer Advertising in Legal and Ethical Perspective, 65
1984
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the blanket prohibition of lawyer advertising as set forth in the
Arizona disciplinary code was challenged. 55 Bates, an attorney, had
placed an advertisement in an Arizona newspaper announcing the
establishment of a "legal clinic" and stating the cost of certain rou-
tine legal matters.5" Because this advertisement was violative of
DR 2-101(B),57 the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that Bates was to
be publicly censured. 8 On appeal, however, the United States Su-
preme Court, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, took special no-
tice of the dissent filed by Justice Holohan of the Arizona Supreme
Court." Justice Holohan had maintained that the consumers' right
to information was paramount and that regulation of lawyer adver-
tising should be limited to advertisement that was deceptive or
misleading.60 The Bates court essentially adopted the view of Jus-
tice Holohan's dissent. This view echoed one previously espoused
by the Court in the area of commercial speech in Virginia Phar-
macy Board v. Virginia Consumer Counsel."'
The issue decided in Bates was narrow, dealing specifically with
an attorney's right to advertise prices of routine services.62 The va-
rious reasons offered to the Court for upholding a complete ban on
lawyer advertising were found untenable. The Court found that
advertising services would not turn a lawyer into a "hustler" in the
marketplace, nor lead inevitably to misleading the public." Fur-
MARQ. L. REV. 547 (1982).
55. 433 U.S. at 353, 355. Bates' challenge of the State's disciplinary rules under sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2 (1976), was dismissed by the Court.
56. 433 U.S. at 354. The routine matters involved standard services, such as uncon-
tested divorces, uncontested adoptions, name changes and simple personal bankruptcies. Id.
57. Id. at 355. Section (B) provided, in pertinent part, that:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer
affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertise-
ment in the city or telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor
shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmEEiTy DR 2-101 (1970), 17A ARzz. REV. STAT. Rule
29(a)(Supp. 1983).
58. 433 U.S. at 356-58.
59. Id. at 358.
60. Id.
61. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See supra note 9.
62. 433 U.S. at 367-68. The Court specifically decided not to address the issues of
advertising concerning quality of legal services or in-person solicitation. Id. at 366.
63. Id. at 368-75. With respect to the argument concerning the inevitable appearance
of misleading advertising, the Court determined that unique services applicable to only a
very specific populous would, in all probability, not be advertised. Further, the Court
doubted that consumers would be induced to retain an attorney merely because services
were advertised. Finally, the Court observed that advertising cannot provide a complete
foundation upon which to select an attorney, since no advertisement can completely address
Vol. 23:305
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ther, an increase in litigation or an increase in cost of lawyer ser-
vices to the consumer seemed dubious reasons for prohibiting all
lawyer advertising. 4 Finally, neither poor work quality by the law-
yer nor practical difficulties in overseeing advertising offered
enough substance to uphold the complete ban.65
Despite the Supreme Court's rejection of the proffered justifica-
tions for upholding the total ban on lawyer advertising, some regu-
lation in this area was permitted. In particular, advertising that
was false, fraudulent or misleading, along with advertisements
which encouraged criminal activity, were held to be subject to
restraint.66
Chief Justice Burger's concurring and dissenting opinion in
Bates emphasized the problem of what constituted "routine" ser-
vices, an issue which he believed the Court had ignored. Because of
the undefined nature of the term "routine," according to Chief
Justice Burger, incomplete information could be given to the pub-
lic in some advertisements that would be more harmful than the
Court was willing to admit.6"
Justice Powell, in a separate dissent, disagreed with the Court's
reliance on Virginia Pharmacy. In the latter case, Justice Powell
asserted, the Court ruled on price advertising for standardized,
fungible drug products, a commodity quite different from the indi-
vidual services offered by lawyers. The type of advertising now
permitted by Bates, he concluded, lent itself to deception and inef-
fective regulation.68 Justice Powell concluded that bar associations
on the state and national level, and not individual lawyers, should
undertake to inform the public of services available.6 9
Although Bates opened the door for lawyer advertising, certain
the attorney's qualifications. Still, the Court found this to be insufficient justification to ban
all advertising, maintaining that the provision of some information was better than a total
absence. Id. at 372-74.
64. Id. at 376-78. On the contrary, the Court maintained, increased advertising could
prevent an injured party from suffering needlessly and could very well result in lower prices
for the consumer because of increased competition. Id.
65. Id. at 378-79. The Court observed that advertising would not prevent shoddy work
by a lawyer predisposed to offering such work product nor would the volume of advertising
lawyers prevent competent supervision by a disciplinary agency. Id.
66. Id. at 383-84.
67. Id. at 387 (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
68. Id. at 350, 390-91 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Powell observed
that the individual services required of any lawyer when confronted by a legal problem op-
erated to prohibit totally accurate price advertising for "routine" services. He further stated
that the sheer volume of lawyers and diversity of jurisdictions could prohibit effective regu-
lation of advertising. Id. at 392.
69. Id. at 398.
1984
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conduct was still subject to restraint, as indicated in the Supreme
Court's consideration of Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association."0
Ohralik involved in-person solicitation, an issue deliberately not
addressed in Bates.71 In Ohralik, the petitioner-attorney, upon
hearing of an automobile accident, appeared at the home of the 18
year old driver offering legal assistance. The attorney, Ohralik,
subsequently visited the driver in her hospital room and also vis-
ited her passenger on the day of her release from the hospital.
Ohralik secured acquiescence from both women to his representa-
tion of them and to a contingent fee agreement. 2 Because of this
solicitation, violative of DR 2-103(A) and DR 2-104(A), the Su-
preme Court of Ohio ordered that Ohralik be indefinitely
suspended.73
In affirming the Ohio court's ruling, the Court identified as the
critical distinction between Bates' and Ohralik's conduct the inher-
ent pitfalls of in-person solicitation, the Court concluding that
such activity was by its very nature productive of coerced and har-
ried decisions. 74 In terms of regulatory propriety, the court contin-
ued, the state was able to advance stronger legitimate interests
against in-person solicitation than against a general advertisement
scheme: the state clearly must protect the public from coercive,
fraudulent and intimidating tactics by the legal profession.7 5 In so
doing, the court continued, the state need not await actual injury
by some member of the populace from the solicitation.76The pur-
pose of the solicitation ban was preventive in nature, meant to de-
ter invasion of a person's privacy by a lawyer seeking purely mone-
tary gain."
At the opposite end of the solicitation scale was similar conduct
70. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). See supra note 12. For analysis and discussion of Ohralik, see
The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARv. L. REV. 185 (1978); Daly, In-Person Solicitation
by Public Interest Law Firms: A Look at the A.B.A. Code Provisions in Light of Primus
and Ohralik, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 309 (1981).
71. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
72. 436 U.S. at 449-52. Both women later attempted to discharge Ohralik. The driver,
however, was forced to pay Ohralik one third of her ultimate recovery as settlement of his
suit against her for breach of contract. Id. at 452 n.5.
73. Id. at 454. For the text of DR 2-103(A) and DR 2-104(A), see supra notes 29 and
30. The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of
Ohio had recommended only public reprimand. 436 U.S. at 454.
74. Id. at 457.
75. Id. at 462.
76. Id. at 464.
77. Id. at 464-65. In the words of the Court, "the Rules were applied in this case to
discipline a lawyer for soliciting employment for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely
to result in the adverse consequences the State seeks to avert." (emphasis added). Id. at 464.
314 Vol. 23:305
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in In Re Primus, s the companion case of Ohralik. Justice Powell,
delivering the opinion of the Court, classified the attorney's con-
duct as political expression, protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments because of its associational character. 79
Primus, an attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), was called to Aiken County, South Carolina to review the
possibility of a lawsuit, after it had been discovered that, as a con-
dition for continuance of medical assistance under the Medicaid
program, various women in that county were being sterilized. After
her visit, Primus wrote a letter to one particular woman who
Primus believed was interested in initiating the suit. Primus ad-
vised the woman that the ACLU offered free legal assistance to
any woman who had been sterilized and who wished to file suit.80
As a result of her letter, Primus was charged with violating DR
2-103(D)(5)(a) and DR 2-104(A)(5), prohibiting solicitation."1
Thereafter, the Supreme Court of South Carolina entered an order
imposing a public reprimand, which was subsequently overruled by
the Supreme Court.
8 2
The Court in Primus rested its decision on a previous rationale
espoused in NAACP v. Button."8 The Court found that the con-
duct in the latter case was political in nature, with its aim the ad-
vancement of political ideas and beliefs. 4 This aim, the Primus
court held, was precisely that possessed by the petitioner." Like
the NAACP in Button, the ACLU was found by the court to do
more than merely represent legal claims. Rather, the ACLU carried
on extensive educational and lobbying efforts and represented
many unpopular claims.86 Although the ACLU may be awarded
counsel fees, the Court pointed out, such awards go to the main
78. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). For analysis and discussion of Primus, see supra note 70.
79. 436 U.S. at 414.
80. Id. at 414-17. The woman whom Primus was alleged to have solicited eventually
released her doctor of all liability and failed to participate in any suit concerning the sterili-
zation. Id. at 417.
81. Id. at 418-20 nn.10-11.
82. 436 U.S. at 421. The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the
Supreme Court of South Carolina had recommended only a private reprimand. Id.
83. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In Button, staff attorneys for the NAACP joined with its
affiliates to offer legal advice concerning racial discrimination to a group of prospective liti-
gants. Id. at 415-16.
84. 436 U.S. at 422-26.
85. Id. at 422. In the words of the Court, "her actions were undertaken to express
personal political beliefs and to advance the civil-liberties objectives of the ACLU, rather
than to derive financial gain." Id.
86. 436 U.S. at 427-28.
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treasury of the ACLU and are usually subject to court approval.8"
Thus, any financial gain by Primus was found not to be personal
and probably not as remunerative as any that might have been re-
alized in a case such as Ohralik. Finally, because of the Court's
determination that Primus' conduct was primarily political and as-
sociational in nature, any regulation affecting it was constitution-
ally required to be narrowly drafted. The disciplinary rules under
consideration, which provided for complete prohibition of solicita-
tion, were thus found to sweep too broadly.
88
Justice Marshall filed one opinion for both Ohralik and Primus,
concurring in both outcomes. Justice Marshall, however, expressed
some reservation, since he saw these two cases as opposite ends of
a spectrum.8 9 He asserted that the ban on solicitation hindered the
flow of important information to those who needed it-consumers.
Further, it hindered the ability of sole practitioners from advanc-
ing their practice.90 Therefore, if the questioned solicitation fell
into neither category advanced by Ohralik or Primus, but rather
was "honest, unpressured 'commercial' solicitation," Justice Mar-
shall did not believe that it should be subject to restraint.91
Justice Rehnquist, meanwhile, dissented in both Ohralik and
Primus, maintaining that the "constitutional inquiry must focus on
the character of the conduct . ..and not on the motives of the
individual lawyers or the nature of the particular litigation in-
volved."92 Justice Rehnquist claimed that because the Court in
Primus seemed to rest its decision on the political activity of the
ACLU, any lawyer now charged with solicitation will clothe the in-
volved controversy in political garb.93 The distinction between the
two cases, according to Justice Rehnquist, was unnecessary; rather,
the state should be left to determine when solicitation interferes
with the state's legitimate interest of protecting consumers from
87. Id. at 428-30.
88. Id. at 432-33. The key to determining whether the conduct is in-person solicitation
or political activity is the nature of the conduct. Ohralik involved a purely commercial ven-
ture resulting in possible large pecuniary gain to the attorney. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 467-
68. The activity in Primus, on the other hand, offered little pecuniary gain to the individual
lawyer; rather, it advanced political beliefs. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 422. The latter was, of
course, entitled to greater protection than the former. Id. at 437-38.
89. 436 U.S. 447, 471 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
90. Id. at 473-76.
91. Id. at 476.
92. 436 U.S. 412, 443 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 442.
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coercive activity by lawyers.9 '
A significant case decided after the complete ban on lawyer ad-
vertising was lifted in Bates, was In Re R.M.J."5 The Missouri dis-
ciplinary rules, revised after Bates, allowed limited advertising by
lawyers.9 The limitation permitted only certain categories of infor-
mation and the use of specific language.97 The rule further limited
the advertising lawyer to the use of specific descriptive categories,
if the lawyer chose to list the areas of his practice. Additionally,
the use of a disclaimer of expertise was required in the advertise-
ment.98 Finally, there was a disciplinary rule limiting the mailing
of announcement cards to specific groups of people."
The attorney in In Re R.M.J. violated the disciplinary rules in
three advertisements which contained language not in accordance
with that required by the rules, and which also listed the courts in
which he was admitted to practice. In at least two of the advertise-
ments, the attorney failed to include the disclaimer requirement.
Additionally, the lawyer mailed announcement cards to persons
other than those specifically permitted by the rules. 00 Despite the
attorney's contention that, aside from the disclaimer requirement,
the disciplinary rules violated the first and fourteenth amend-
ments, the Supreme Court of Missouri ordered that a private rep-
rimand be imposed. Two justices of the court dissented, however,
maintaining that the charges should have been dismissed. 10'
On appeal, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Mis-
souri court, essentially summarizing the Bates decision which per-
mitted regulation of advertising that was false, misleading or
fraudulent. Additionally, the Court noted that a state may regulate
94. Id. at 443-46.
95. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). See supra note 19. For discussion and analysis of In re
R.M.J., see Casenote, Reassessing the Extention of First Amendment Protection to Attor-
ney Advertising, 32 CATH. U.L. Rav. 729 (1983); Whitman and Stoltenberg, The Present
Constitutional Status of Lawyer Advertising - Theoretical and Practical Implications of In
Re R.M.J., 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 445 (1983).
96. 455 U.S. at 193. The disciplinary rule involved was 2-101. Id. at n.1.
97. Id. at 194. The categories of information permitted to be advertised included the
listing of "routine" legal services. Id. at n.3.
98. 455 U.S. at 195 n.6.
99. 455 U.S. at 196. DR 2-102 required that the mailing of professional cards be lim-
ited to "lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives." Id.
100. Id. at 196-97. In the advertisement, the attorney had indicated that he was ad-
mitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court and had listed his areas of practice as
"personal injury" and "real estate," rather than using the terms "tort law" and "property
law," as required by the rules. Id. at 197.
101. Id. at 198. The dissenting Justices maintained that the state lacked a significant
interest that would legitimate the regulation of lawyer advertising in this manner. Id.
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other forms of commercial speech which are not misleading if a
substantial state interest is advanced. 102 In applying this test to
the case before it, the Court did not find the lawyer's use of de-
scriptive categories not designated in the rules to be misleading.
Indeed, they were viewed as more precise than those categories
listed in the rules.103 Although the attorney advertising his admis-
sion to the Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court was considered some-
what tasteless, it was not found to be misleading. Neither was the
lawyer's indication of the state bars in which he was admitted. In
fact, the information, at least as to state bar admittance, was
deemed highly relevant by the Court, which found that the state
court had failed to articulate substantial state interests to legiti-
mize the regulation of this activity.10 4 Finally, the restriction on
the mailing of announcement cards to specified groups was deemed
violative of the first and fourteenth amendments. The Court drew
this conclusion from the lack of evidence in the record that a less
restrictive method of supervision had even been attempted.10 5
If the present Code of Professional Responsibility is maintained
in Pennsylvania, the advertising, solicitation and disclaimer regula-
tions contained in the Code must be amended to reflect the hold-
ing in Spencer.10 6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has
102. Id. at 199-203. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64.
103. 455 U.S. at 205. See supra note 100.
104. Id. at 205-06.
105. Id. at 206. Because the attorney did not challenge the constitutionality of the
disclaimer requirement, it was not addressed by the Court. Id. at 204 n.18.
106. 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984). In response to the Bates, Ohralik, and Primus
rulings, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, by order dated July 27, 1979, lifted the complete
ban on lawyer advertising. Only advertising that was false, fraudulent or misleading was
prohibited. See Supreme Court Order, No. 47 Rules Docket No.1, 9 Pa. Admin. Bull. 2620
(No. 32, August 11, 1979).
After Spencer, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a suspension order affecting the
challenged rules. That order was dated April 26, 1984, and provides in pertinent part, as
follows:
1. To the extent that notice of proposed rule-making would be required by Rule 103
of the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration or otherwise, the suspension of
the following Rules of disciplinary enforcement pending their deletion, amendment or
reinstatement is hereby found to be required in the interest of justice.
2. DR 2-102(D) is suspended and the conduct sought to be regulated thereby shall be
governed during the effect of this Order by DR 2-101(A) and any other applicable
disciplinary rule.
3. DR 2-103(A) is suspended insofar as it may be interpreted to prohibit advertising
whether by direct mail or otherwise which is not violative of DR 2-101(A) or which is
not intended to appeal to a person or persons of impaired judgment or reason.
4. DR 2-104(A) is hereby suspended.
5. DR 2-105(B) is hereby suspended and the conduct sought to be regulated thereby
shall be governed during the effect of this Order by DR 2-105(A) and any other appli-
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pending before it the adoption of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (MRPC), as adopted by the American Bar Association,





6. DR 2-105(A) is hereby suspended insofar as it may be interpreted to prohibit the
truthful and accurate announcement in lawyer-to-lawyer advertising of background,
education and experience which is not violative of DR 2-101(A) or any other applica-
ble disciplinary rule.
Interim Suspension Order, No. 434 Disciplinary Docket No. 2, 14 Pa. Admin. Bull. 1547
(No. 18, May 5, 1984).
107. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Draft Adopted by the ABA 1983). The
model rules which encompass the lawyer advertising issues dealt with in Spencer provide, in
pertinent part, as follows:
Rule 7.1 Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the
lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it: (a) contains a material
misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement
considered as a whole not materially misleading; (b) is likely to create an unjustified
expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer
can achieve results by means that violate the rules of professional conduct or other
law; or (c) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the com-
parision can be factually substantiated.
Rule 7.2 Advertising
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1, a lawyer may advertise services through
public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other peri-
odical, outdoor, radio or television, or through written communication not involving
solicitation as defined in Rule 7.3.
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or written communication shall be kept
for two years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was
used.
(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the law-
yer's services, except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of advertising or
written communication permitted by this Rule and may pay the usual charges of a
not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal service organization.
(d) Any communication made pursuant to this rule shall include the name of at least
one lawyer responsible for its content.
Rule 7.3 Direct Contact with Prospective Clients
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with
whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in-person
or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecu-
niary gain. The term "solicit" includes contact in person, by telephone or telegraph,
by letter or other writing, or by other communication directed to a specific recipient,
but does not include letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed generally to
persons not known to need legal services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a
particular matter, but who are so situated that they might in general find such ser-
vices useful.
Rule 7.4 Communication of Fields of Practice
A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not practice in
particular fields of law. A lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is a special-
ist except as follows: (a) a lawyer admitted to engage in patent practice before the
United States patent and trademark office may use the designation "patent attorney"
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Disciplinary Rules 2-102(D) and (E), which deal with dual-pro-
fession advertising, appear already to be in conformity with Spen-
cer, given the stipulation by the state with respect to the limited
scope of application of the sections. 0 8 The MRPC apparently
would also permit such advertising, because no restrictive language
is contained therein, and thus, in this regard, the rules are likewise
in line with Spencer.
Disciplinary Rules 2-103 and 2-104, which provide for a total
prohibition of attorney solicitation, find their replacement in Rule
7.3 of the MRPC. 109 The new rule allows for a more relaxed atmo-
sphere for solicitation, allowing direct mail solicitation to the attor-
ney's family or to any person with whom the attorney had previous
legal dealings. General mailings announcing legal services are also
permissible. However, the rule's use of the phrase "may not," when
limiting other types of solicitation, creates a potential loophole in
the rule which may lead to difficulties with its enforcement and, in
fact, implies that there could be situations where normally prohib-
ited activity would be allowed. It appears that the MRPC's use of
"may not," rather than the DR's use of "shall not" in 2-103(A) will
result in a rule less restrictive than that found by Judge Lord to
infringe on the first amendment rights of attorneys; thus the rule is
permissible under Spencer. Still, the very nature of solicitation is
fraught with potential for coercion and the exertion of undue influ-
ence-contingencies also recognized by Judge Lord. Therefore, the
scope of permitted solicitation should be specifically outlined, with
the words "shall not" applying to all nonpermitted solicitation.
As an additional matter, Rule 7.3 in its current form prohibits
solicitation only when a "significant motive" of the attorney is pe-
cuniary gain. This adjective-"significant"-indicating the level
below which actions do not constitute solicitation, renders the rule
unenforceable. Its meaning is completely subjective, producing the
or substantially similar designation; (b) a lawyer engaged in admiralty practice may
use the designation "admiralty," "proctor in admiralty" or a substantially similar
designation; and (c) (provisions on designation of specialization of the particular
state).
Rule 7.5 Firm Names and Letterheads
(a) A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation
that violates Rule 7.1. A trade name may be used by a lawyer in private practice if it
does not imply a connection with a government agency or with a public or charitable
legal services organization and is not otherwise in violation of Rule 7.1.
Id. For a complete reproduction of the Model Rules, see M. Pmsic & K. KmwIN, PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 555-66 (4th ed. 1984).
108. See supra note 23.
109. See supra note 107.
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same pitfalls as those noted by Judge Lord in describing the diffi-
culty of discerning the meaning of a "competent" or "experienced"
attorney. The term is thus susceptible to challenge as unconstitu-
tionally vague.
Disclaimer requirements, such as those found in DR 2-105(A)(3)
and (B) are addressed in Rule 7.4 of the MRPC, 110 which prohibits
language indicating or implying a specialized area of practice, other
than those of patent or admiralty. " The prohibition of words im-
plying practice in a specialized area is an important and vital char-
acteristic of the proposed rule. Failure to include this prohibition
in the final rule would leave the rule open for potential abuse by a
lawyer who could imply his expertise by indicating that his prac-
tice is "exclusively limited to "designated areas.112 The disclaimer
requirement may indeed have a negative implication attached to
it;'" s nevertheless, because advertising is now less subject to judi-
cial scrutiny, and because Pennsylvania continues to recognize only
patent and admiralty law as specialties, Rule 7.4, if adopted,
should not be altered.
Since the late 1970's, the legal profession has undergone sub-
stantial change in one of its most traditionally sensitive ar-
eas-advertising. That change is surely not yet complete. In the
future, advertising rules must be designed to give the minimum
constitutional protection to the lawyer and the maximum constitu-
tional protection to the lay public.
Rose Marie Albarano
110. Id.
111. The lawyer-to-lawyer advertising addressed in Spencer, see supra note 50 and
accompanying text, is not addressed by the rule.
112. MODEL RuLES, supra note 107. Adoption of Rule 7.4 would prohibit the use of
such language; the Comment to Rule 7.4 states that phrases such as "concentrate in" or
"limited to" have taken on a meaning indicating a specialty, and thus should also be prohib-
ited. Id.
113. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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